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Abstract
This study examines how managers change their forecasting behavior as a debt
covenant violation approaches. Using a sample of firms that disclose a debt covenant
violation (DCV) in their financial statements, we find that management forecasts are
more optimistic in the period leading up to a DCV, and this result is not driven by
managers’ unintentional forecast bias. Additionally, we find that managers who are
more optimistic in their forecasts also take on more risk and increase dividend payouts
before violations, consistent with managers strategically using earnings forecasts to
justify their activities favorable to shareholders but likely to be curtailed by lenders in
the event of a DCV. In addition, we find that managers are more likely to optimistically
bias their earnings forecasts when they have a higher risk of losing control rights in the
event of a DCV. Lastly, we find managers who are more optimistic in their forecasts
are less likely to be replaced (i.e., lower CEO turnover) after a DCV. Overall, our
results are consistent with managers changing their disclosure behavior in an attempt
to justify actions that are favorable to equity investors but would likely be opposed by
debtholders, which in turn improves their job security.
Keywords: Debt Covenant Violation, Strategic Disclosure, Risk-Shifting
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1 Introduction
This paper examines how managers strategically alter their provision of voluntary disclo-
sure to capital market participants before a debt covenant violation (hereafter, DCV). The
accounting literature has extensively studied managers’ incentives to voluntarily disclose part
or all of the private information they possess about firms’ future fundamentals (e.g., Beyer
et al., 2010). The repetitive nature of the decision to disclose additional information leads
managers to have incentives to credibly commit to a truthful disclosure regime. However,
prior studies also provide evidence that managers are more likely to intentionally bias the
voluntarily disclosed information when there are benefits to doing so for managers and their
firms (e.g., Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Kross et al., 2011; Hilary et al., 2014). In this paper,
we show that managers intentionally bias the information disclosed prior to a DCV in order
to justify taking actions favorable to equity investors that would be curtailed by debtholders
after a violation.
A large body of research in accounting and finance has documented the costs and con-
sequences of DCVs. DCVs lead to large negative stock price reactions, increases in interest
rates, and difficulty in securing further financing (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Roberts
and Sufi, 2009a). Additionally, recent research provides evidence that DCVs are associated
with a shift of firm control to lenders (see e.g., Roberts and Sufi, 2009b, for a survey of this
literature). The shift of control rights is significant, resulting in changes to CEO turnover,
corporate restructuring, and reductions in dividend payouts to shareholders (Nini et al.,
2012). In extreme cases, lenders can even step in and obtain control rights before an actual
DCV if lenders successfully petition the courts and argue that a borrower has experienced a
”material adverse change” in its financial position.1 Prior research provides strong evidence
that managers use both real actions and accruals manipulation to avoid violating a covenant
(Sweeney, 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Beatty and Weber,
1BNP Paribas SA Ors v Yukos Oil Company, Court of Appeal - Chancery Division, June 24, 2005, [2005]
EWHC 1321 (Ch).
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2003). However, there is no evidence related to whether managers have incentives to modify
their disclosure behavior before a DCV is disclosed, even if it does not help avoid a DCV
(i.e., a DCV is given). This paper intends to fill this gap.
We argue that managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosure behavior prior to
a DCV in order to reduce the costs associated with a DCV to both managers and their
shareholders. Specifically, after a DCV, debtholders gain the same control rights that they
would in the event of a payment default. For example, prior studies find that lenders decrease
dividend payments and capital expenditures after a DCV – actions that benefit debtholders
but are not desired by shareholders (e.g., Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2012).
Additionally, if managers expect that a DCV is approaching, they have an incentive to
reduce the likelihood of being replaced once control rights shift to lenders after a DCV. We
expect that managers will take actions in advance that place shareholders’ interests ahead
of debtholders’ because it is the shareholders who have bargaining power in selecting and
retaining managers (Hall and Liebman, 1998). However, overly shareholder-friendly actions
that are in opposition to debtholder interests are likely to result in a negative backlash
when debtholders gain control rights following a DCV, both to shareholders and managers
themselves (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Becker and Stromberg, 2012). In a repeated game
with debtholders, therefore, we expect that managers are likely to use optimistic forecasts
prior to a DCV to justify the actions favorable to shareholders and to frame those actions
as an unintentional bias rather than an opportunistic decision. In return, managers have
a greater likelihood of retaining their jobs due to their actions favoring shareholders. In
addition, debtholders granted control rights after a DCV may be less likely to replace a
CEO if debtholders believe she merely made some unintentional bad decisions before a DCV
rather than opportunistic ones.
We examine the above predictions using quarterly management earnings forecasts around
financial covenant violations. We do so for several reasons. First, recent studies have docu-
mented that the majority of debt contracts contain an earnings-based debt covenant and that
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the use of earnings-based covenants has increased substantially over time (Demerjian, 2011).
While in reality firms may violate both financial and non-financial (general) covenants, and
not all financial covenants are directly related to earnings (ex., leverage ratio covenants),
our implicit assumption is that management earnings forecasts do not necessarily need to
directly inform debtholders about the likelihood of an upcoming DCV as long as the fore-
casts help managers justify favorable actions to shareholders resulting from an unintentional
(optimistic) bias rather than an opportunistic decision. This assumption seems reasonable
given that prior studies show that earnings forecasts are a critical component of successful
corporate decisions (e.g., Goodman et al., 2014), and managers have been shown to have an
unintentional information processing bias in producing earnings forecasts (e.g., Gong et al.,
2011). Second, management earnings forecasts represent the most important voluntary dis-
closure channel for managers to set or change the market’s earnings expectation and drive
the majority of market movement relative to other types of voluntary disclosure (Beyer
et al., 2010). It suggests that market participants consider managers, as corporate insiders,
to have better information about a firm’s future prospects, and earnings forecasts are a key
mechanism through which managers convey their private information to the market. Third,
another important implicit assumption in our study is that a DCV is predictable by managers
who take strategic actions accordingly. We focus on quarterly forecasts because managers
are more likely to possess precise information (e.g., an approaching DCV) when they issue
short-term (e.g., quarterly) forecasts compared to long-term (e.g., annual) forecasts (Fuller
and Jensen, 2002; Hirst et al., 2008; Kross et al., 2011; Hilary et al., 2014).
Our empirical evidence is consistent with our predictions. First, we find that management
forecasts issued in the quarter before a DCV are more optimistically biased (relative to
the eventually realized earnings) than forecasts not preceding a DCV. These results are
both economically and statistically significant and are consistent with managers attempting
to decrease the perceived likelihood of an upcoming covenant violation. For example, we
document that the magnitude of management forecast bias increases by approximately 70%
4
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of one-standard-deviation for firms approaching a DCV compared to firms not approaching
a DCV.
Next, we perform a series of cross-sectional analyses to test the prediction that managers
who take actions that are beneficial to shareholders but may be detrimental to debtholders
are more likely to bias their forecasts. Consistent with this conflict-of-interest argument, we
find that managers who invest more in capital expenditures, take on more risky projects, or
authorize large increases (> 50%) in dividend payouts in the quarter before a DCV is an-
nounced, relative to the same quarter in the preceding year, are more likely to optimistically
bias their forecasts. Taken together, these findings provide evidence that managers attempt
to justify taking actions that benefit equity holders at the expense of debtholders.
Furthermore, we predict and find that the intensity of managers strategically altering
their forecasts prior to an upcoming DCV increases with the costs of a DCV but is constrained
by the costs or opportunities of biasing forecasts. Specifically, on the one hand, we find that
our results are more pronounced for borrowers facing a higher risk of losing control rights, as
measured by financial distress and the importance of private debt in overall debt financing
(Baird and Rasmussen, 2006; Ivashina et al., 2016). On the other hand, we find that managers
are less likely to optimistically bias their forecasts if the market has a greater ability to detect
a bias (Rogers and Stocken, 2005) or when managers have greater reputation concerns related
to issuing biased forecasts (e.g., Kreps et al., 1982; Gao et al., 2014). We interpret these
results as evidence that debtholders are more likely to see through such strategic behavior
and, hence, the net benefits of issuing biased forecasts before a DCV are not high enough.
In addition, we also investigate whether the decision to issue optimistic forecasts before
a DCV provides personal benefits to managers. We show that issuing optimistic forecasts
before a DCV is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a CEO being replaced. This
finding further supports the prediction that managers personally benefit from aligning their
earnings forecasts with the actions they take to favor shareholders leading up to a DCV. It
is also consistent with the conjecture that debtholders who have control rights after a DCV
5
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are less likely to replace a CEO if they believe she merely made some unintentional bad
decisions rather than took opportunistic actions.
Finally, we perform several additional tests to ensure the robustness and validity of our
inferences. Our main concern is that our results may be driven by optimistic managers in-
stead of rational managers deliberately modifying their forecasts before a DCV. Additionally,
if overconfident managers tend to overestimate their ability and judgment when managing
firms (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2013), they may also be more likely to violate covenants. The
positive correlation between covenant violations and managerial optimism arising from this
omitted variable could potentially bias our estimated effect upwards. Thus, our results may
be driven by overconfident managers taking on more risk, rather than by rational managers
deliberately altering the characteristics of their own forecasts in order to favor equity holders
before the occurrence of a DCV. To first rule out this concern, we investigate and find that
the width of management forecasts increases in the quarter preceding the DCV, which is
inconsistent with prior research suggesting that managers’ behavioral biases (i.e., overconfi-
dence) are associated with decreased forecasting width (Hilary and Hsu, 2011; Hilary et al.,
2016), but is more consistent with their strategic choice on the forecast precision because
lower precision reduces outsiders’ ability to be aware of forecast bias (e.g., Cheng et al.,
2013; Smith and Koonce, 2019) . More importantly, we fail to find that our results are
more pronounced for managers with a longer history of better past forecast accuracy, which
also suggests that a behavioral bias (overconfidence) cannot explain our findings (Hilary and
Hsu, 2011). Next, we test for and fail to find a difference in forecast bias prior to a DCV
between firms with prior good versus bad performance. This again plausibly mitigates the
concern that our results are driven by behavioral traits because prior research finds that
the behavioral bias of optimism in forecasting arises predominantly in firms that have ex-
perienced recent success (Hilary et al., 2016). Last, we find that our results are robust to
considering trend effects, the effect of the omitted variable issue following Nini et al. (2012)
(e.g., considering various proxies for the actual firm performance of the DCV quarter that
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the earnings forecasts correspond to), or the selection bias in either the propensity to issue
forecasts or the likelihood of violating a debt covenant.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature
investigating covenant violation. Prior research has documented that covenant violation is
costly and that managers take actions to avoid DCVs (e.g., Sweeney, 1994; DeFond and
Jiambalvo, 1994; Beneish and Press, 1995; Beatty and Weber, 2003). Taking an upcoming
DCV as given, we provide evidence consistent with managers altering their voluntary disclo-
sure choices beforehand in an attempt to reduce the costs associated with the DCV ex post,
at least with respect to managers’ career outcomes. Our findings partially explain why some
managers are replaced after a DCV while others are not.(Nini et al., 2012).
Second, we add to the large literature on voluntary management disclosure. Specifically,
our results complement previous findings that managers intentionally introduce bias in their
earnings forecasts. For example, Cheng and Lo (2006) and Cheng et al. (2013) find that
managers use their forecasts to influence stock prices before selling or buying shares of their
firm. Prior works also document that managers strategically use earnings forecasts to ”walk
down” market expectations to a beatable level (e.g., Gong et al., 2009), and Kross et al.
(2011) investigate the benefits to shareholders if managers issue pessimistic forecasts. These
studies, however, do not fully examine the costs of these strategies or have largely ignored
the benefits of issuing optimistic forecasts. Several other studies including Kothari et al.
(2009) and Baginski et al. (2018) show that career concerns encourage managers to withhold
bad news in the hope that they may never have to disclose it if the firm’s status improves
before the required information release (Graham et al., 2005). Additionally, Ge and Lennox
(2011) find no evidence that managers issue optimistic forecasts before an acquisition using
stock and argue that ”deception by commission” is too costly in terms of litigation risk in
their setting. Our results do not intend to dispute the costs of issuing optimistic forecasts
to shareholders documented in prior studies (e.g., negative stock price reactions to missing
earnings targets or litigation risk) (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Skinner and Sloan, 2002), but rather,
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we provide an alternative view and evidence that managers have incentives to issue optimistic
earnings forecasts when the benefits outweigh the costs of misleading investors in the setting
of the conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders.
Lastly, we offer interesting insights into the agency considerations that exist as managers
choose actions before a DCV that affect debt and equity holders differently. We provide
evidence that managers use their voluntary earnings forecasts to justify taking the exact
actions that lenders are likely to discourage, while also increasing their odds of being retained
at the firm following a violation – a set of findings of interest to researchers, practitioners,
and regulators. Consistent with several recent studies in finance that highlight the transfer
of control rights to creditors after a DCV (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a; Nini et al., 2012), we find
that managers prepare for a loss of control rights and take actions to benefit shareholders
and managers themselves to the detriment of creditors in advance.
In the next section we develop our hypotheses. We describe the sample selection proce-
dures and variables in Section 3. Section 4 presents the main empirical results, and Section
5 presents the results of additional analyses. A summary and conclusions appear in Section
6.
2 Background and Hypothesis Development
As capital providers, lenders focus on ensuring the timely repayment of the principal and
interest that are their claims on a borrower’s future cash flow and assets. Because debtholders
suffer from borrowers’ economic losses but do not share in the benefits of economic gains,
they seek to gain control of the firm and prevent the firm from taking further risk as soon
as possible when a firm faces potential credit or solvency issues(see e.g., Aghion and Bolton,
1992). Debt covenants are included in lending contracts in order to reduce the ability of
managers to extract rents from debt holders and to turn control of the firm over to creditors
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during bad economic states of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).2 Debt covenants are
financial tripwires that shift control rights to lenders when activated, and they restrict the
actions that managers are allowed to take after debt issuance. Managers accept the costs of
including debt covenants, however, because their commitment to restrict their actions and
forfeit control during bad states ex ante generates more favorable borrowing terms (Bradley
and Roberts, 2004).
Covenant violation is costly to shareholders (see, e.g., Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995;
Sufi, 2009; Nini et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2015). Following a DCV, lenders are entitled to
demand immediate repayment of the loan, or they can renegotiate the contract or grant a
waiver. Dichev and Skinner (2002) document that the most common outcomes of a DCV
are obtaining a waiver and renegotiating the contract. Both of these outcomes, however, can
be costly. Beneish and Press (1993) estimate that the average cost of a DCV attributable to
increased interest rates and renegotiation or waiver fees is between one and two percent of
the market value of equity for their sample of firms. DCVs may also lead to costs through
the inclusion of additional covenants to the debt contract during the negotiation process
(Core and Schrand, 1999).
In addition to the above negative consequences of DCVs, recent research provides evi-
dence that DCVs are associated with a shift of firm control to lenders and other consequences
that are also costly to both shareholders and managers (see e.g., Roberts and Sufi, 2009b,
for a survey of this literature). For example, Chava and Roberts (2008) report that cap-
ital investment decreases after financial covenant violation, and Roberts and Sufi (2009a)
find that DCVs increase borrowers’ interest rates and restrict firms’ access to debt markets.
Moreover, Nini et al. (2012) find that DCVs lead to corporate restructuring, slowdowns in
mergers and acquisitions, reductions in dividend payouts, and CEO turnover. These studies
provide evidence that firms that violate debt covenants incur costs related to the transfer of
2Jensen and Meckling (1976) list unwarranted distributions to shareholders, issuance of higher-priority
debt claims, and investments in negative net present value projects for purposes of empire building and
diversification as potential actions that the inclusion of debt covenants attempts to prevent.
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control to lenders even before formal payment default.
Note that it is also possible for lenders to step in and exert control over a borrower
even before a violation takes place if they can convince a judge that a material adverse
change (MAC) has occurred. The purpose of an MAC is to protect a lender’s position if
there is a detrimental change in circumstance affecting a borrower’s ability to repay the
loan, even in the absence of a technical covenant violation (Doulai and Wells, 2013). In
one notable example of a lender stepping in before an actual covenant violation, in the
case of BNP Paribas v Yukos Oil Co, the High Court determined that a lead arranger for a
syndicate of banks was justified in accelerating a loan because a recent significant adverse tax
determination on the borrower “might reasonably be expected to have a material adverse
effect.” The court held that the acceleration by the loan syndicate was not wrongful. If
lenders believe that an upcoming DCV is imminent and unavoidable, they may attempt to
argue that an accelerated transfer of control rights is justifiable.
Given the severity of the cost of DCVs, managers exercise their reporting discretion on fi-
nancial statements to avoid DCVs. For example, Sweeney (1994) finds that firms in technical
default make more income-increasing accounting changes. Using measures of ”discretionary”
accruals, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that firms use more abnormal accruals to avoid
debt covenant constraints. Beatty and Weber (2003) find that firms with debt covenants
are more likely to adopt income-increasing accounting policies than are firms without debt
covenants. An unanswered question is whether managers have incentives to modify their
disclosure behavior before a DCV is disclosed, even if it does not help avoid the violation
(i.e., a DCV is given).
Management earnings forecasts are voluntary disclosures that provide managers’ estimate
of expected earnings over a given period. This channel is one of the main mechanisms for
managers to set or change the market’s earnings expectation. A long literature in accounting
has found that management earnings forecasts provide relevant information to market par-
ticipants. For example, prior studies have found that management forecasts are associated
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with changes in stock prices (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003), decreases in cost of capital (Frankel
et al., 1995; Coller and Yohn, 1997), and revisions in analysts’ forecasts (Waymire, 1986;
Cotter et al., 2006). Over 90 percent of managers surveyed by Graham et al. (2005) con-
firm that managers issue voluntary forecasts, including management earnings forecasts, to
develop and maintain a reputation for accurate and transparent reporting.3
Despite the reputation incentives to be accurate and consistent when issuing management
earnings forecasts, prior research does find that managers can be strategic in their forecast-
ing behavior. Starting in the 1990s, managers are, on average, pessimistic in their quarterly
earnings forecasts; this trend is often explained as a result of management’s desire to walk
down the market’s – particularly analysts’ – earnings expectations in order to increase the
likelihood of beating market expectations (Matsumoto, 2002; Cotter et al., 2006; Bergman
and Roychowdhury, 2008). Prior studies also document other factors that influence man-
agement forecasting behavior. Lang and Lundholm (2000) show that management forecasts
are more likely to be optimistically biased leading up to an equity offering, while Aboody
and Kaznik (2000) provide evidence that managers issue bad-news earnings forecasts around
stock option award dates in an attempt to temporarily drive down prices. Similarly, Rogers
and Stocken (2005) and Cheng and Lo (2006) show that insider trading is related to bad-
news management forecasts. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that managers
alter their earnings forecasting behavior when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs
of reducing their perceived accuracy and credibility (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Nagar
et al., 2003; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Ge and Lennox, 2011; Kross et al., 2011).
We predict that an upcoming covenant violation will provide a setting in which managers
have incentives to modify their forecasting behavior. If managers believe that lenders are
likely to take actions that will be unfavorable to shareholders and themselves when a covenant
is violated, then they may choose to change their disclosure behavior prior to the disclosure
of a DCV in order to reduce the costs of a violation. We argue that issuing optimistic
3See Hirst et al. (2008) and Beyer et al. (2010) for a review of the management earnings forecast literature.
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earnings forecasts serves this purpose. Facing a potential shift of control rights after a
DCV, managers have greater concerns related to their job security (Nini et al., 2012). On
the one hand, the increase in career concerns encourages managers to take actions that
are favorable to shareholders but will likely be opposed by lenders after a DCV, because
it is the shareholders who have the greatest bargaining power in selecting and retaining
managers (Hall and Liebman, 1998). On the other hand, taking actions that are favorable to
shareholders (but potentially costly to debtholders) without any justification may increase
managers’ reputation costs and the likelihood of being replaced if debtholders view managers
as intentionally hurting the interests of debtholders through their opportunistic actions after
debtholders obtain control rights of the firm. Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that
managers will take precautionary measures before a DCV, for example, providing a rosier
picture of firm performance that is in line with the underlying actions taken by managers
that favor shareholders. Specifically, we argue that managers will issue optimistically biased
forecasts before a DCV, even though this does not help to avoid a DCV. These optimistic
forecasts will help to support the market expectation that managers indeed believe that
firms should take on more risk or distribute wealth to shareholders because such forecasts
could help make outsiders, debtholders, ex post believe that managers merely made some
unintentional bad decisions before a DCV rather than opportunistic ones. Formally,
H1: Management forecasts issued before a debt covenant violation display larger fore-
cast biases and are more optimistic than forecasts issued before quarters with no covenant
violation.
We do not formalize our predictions related to the actions taken by managers in H1.
However, we expect that managers who engage more in activities that will be opposed by
lenders after a DCV will be more likely to optimistically bias their forecasts. Empirically, in
cross-sectional tests, we examine whether the effects of H1 become larger for managers who
make capital expenditures, invest in risky projects, and issue large dividend increases - all
actions that benefit shareholders but which would be opposed by lenders.
12
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3 Sample Selection and Empirical Specification
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Source
To make our study more comparable with the previous studies, we use the sample of
covenant violation data developed by Nini et al. (2009), Roberts and Sufi (2009a), and Nini
et al. (2012). This dataset covers DCVs in the universe of Compustat non-financial US
firms from 1996 to 2009.4 We merge this dataset with management forecast data obtained
from First Call.5 We use managerial quarterly earnings per share (EPS) estimates reported
in the First Call database starting after Reg FD. This sample period allows us to identify
management forecasts directly and to mitigate the potential private communications and
missing data issues prior to Reg FD (Chuk et al., 2013). We focus on quarterly instead
of annual forecasts because managers are more likely to possess more precise information
about quarterly forecasts than annual forecasts, which have a longer horizon. Consistent with
this notion, prior studies demonstrate that managers use quarterly forecasts to strategically
manage market expectations (Fuller and Jensen, 2002; Hirst et al., 2008). Using quarterly
earnings forecasts for each fiscal quarter, we keep all forecasts that are issued before the
actual earnings release to calculate the propensity to issue forecasts and forecast frequency.
However, we retain only the point and range guidance observations to calculate forecast bias
and width, because these variables are less clearly defined for other forms of guidance (such
as open-ended and qualitative guidance).6 Last, we retrieve accounting information from
4This sample of DCVs is comprised of both earnings-based and non-earnings based (ex., leverage) covenant
violations because firms are not required to disclose the exact covenant that was violated. Even if we cannot
tell whether a certain DCV is related to an earnings or a non-earnings based covenant, it does not invalidate
our empirical design because management earnings forecasts do not necessarily need to directly inform
debtholders about the likelihood of an upcoming DCV (ex., leverage) in our setting. Our predictions related
to strategic disclosure before a DCV hold as long as the forecasts help managers justify favorable actions
to shareholders in order that such actions could be attributed to an unintentional bias rather than an
opportunistic decision.
5We retrieve this dataset from Amir Sufi’s website (http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.html).
6Furthermore, in calculating forecast bias and width, we remove any forecasts issued after the fiscal
quarter end (i.e. pre-announcements) to avoid the possibility that pre-announcements may differ in nature
from manager earnings estimates (e.g., McNichols, 1989; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Rogers and Van Buskirk,
2013).
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Compustat’s quarterly data files, and we obtain stock price and returns data from the daily
CRSP files. This procedure provides a sample of 15,698 firm-quarter observations.
3.2 Empirical Specification
To test our first and second hypotheses, we estimate the following regression:
MFV ari,t = β0 + +β1V ioli,t +
n∑
x=1
βxControli,t + i,t (1)
In this empirical model, MFVar stands for a series of management-forecast-related vari-
ables: MFE, and Optim. MFE is the magnitude of forecast optimism, measured as the
difference between management forecast and realized earnings, scaled by price. Optim is
forecast optimism, measured as an indicator variable equal to one if the management fore-
cast is greater than the realized earnings of quarter t, and zero otherwise. Our variable
of interest, Viol, is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm violates a debt covenant in
quarter t, and zero otherwise. Related to our first question, we do not have clear predictions
about changes in forecasting frequency (FreqMF ) or in the likelihood of issuing a forecast
(Issue). As per our H1, we expect the coefficient β1 to be positive and statistically significant
when the dependent variable is MFE or Optim.
We supplement our model with a series of control variables (Controls), and in our sample
of firms leading up to a DCV, we particularly include control variables related to firm perfor-
mance.7 Prior research has identified various managerial incentives that motivate managers
to bias their earnings forecasts for a number of reasons, e.g., to support market expectations
during financial distress (Frost, 1997) (Z-Score), deter potential industry entrants (Newman
and Sansing, 1993) (HHI ), facilitate security issuance (Frankel et al., 1995; Lang and Lund-
holm, 2000) (ExtFin), reduce expected legal costs (Skinner, 1994, 1997) (Litig), and guide
7We also address this issue by following the approach of Nini et al. (2012), reported in the section
”Correlated Omitted Variables”.
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analysts’ forecasts to avoid missing expectations at the earnings announcement (Matsumoto,
2002; Cotter et al., 2006; Gong et al., 2011) (Insto).
Aside from managerial incentives, prior studies document significant relations between
bias and several firm characteristics, including firm performance (ROA, Loss, and Return),
accounting accruals (Bloated), firm size (Size), analyst coverage (Coverage), and growth
opportunity (Btm) (e.g., McNichols, 1989; Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Gong et al., 2009).8
We provide variable definitions in the Appendix A. Lastly, we augment our empirical model
with industry and year fixed effects. Year fixed effects account for intertemporal changes
in management forecast characteristics, and industry fixed effects account for cross-industry
differences (Gong et al., 2011).
We winsorize the top and bottom one percentiles of continuous variables to mitigate the
influence of potential outliers. We employ OLS estimation for models with a continuous
dependent variable, while we use probit estimation for models with a binary dependent
variable. The standard errors are calculated according to the procedure outlined in Cameron
et al. (2011) and are group-wise heteroskedasticity-consistent (i.e., adjusted simultaneously
for heteroskedasticity and the clustering of observations by firm and quarter). Our inferences
are not affected by instead calculating the standard errors using one-way clustering (by firm)
or two-way clustering (by firm and year).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 15,698 firm-quarter observations
with management forecast data. Viol has a mean of 0.031 which indicates that approximately
3% of firm quarters in our sample contain a DCV, compared to the 7% violation rate reported
8Our results are not affected when we further control for a firm’s consistency in meeting or beating
analyst forecasts (Kross et al., 2011; McInnis and Collins, 2011). Likewise, our results are not affected when
we replace Bloated with either total accruals (Gong et al., 2011) or discretionary accruals (Kasznik, 1999;
Gong et al., 2009). Our results are also robust to controlling for internal control quality (Feng et al., 2009),
fourth-quarter effects, the earnings response coefficient (Das et al., 2011), insider trading (Cheng and Lo,
2006), the value-relevance of earnings (Matsumoto, 2002; Hutton, 2005), and lagged forecast characteristics
(Gong et al., 2011). For the sake of brevity, we do not include these additional or alternative controls in our
baseline models.
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by Nini et al. (2012) for the universe of Compustat firms over their sample period. This
difference indicates that the types of firms that issue management forecasts are less likely
to violate a covenant than the average firm in Compustat, consistent with prior findings
that managers at firms with strong financial performance are more likely to issue forecasts
(Miller, 2002). The average management forecast bias (MFE ) in our sample is -0.0004,
which indicates that, on average, managers are pessimistic in their forecasts. This finding
is consistent with prior studies of management forecasts over the quarterly horizon (Hirst
et al., 2008). Optim has a mean value of 0.372 which indicates that roughly 37% of forecasts
are higher than the actual earnings reported.
Switching to our control variables, we see that the means of Z-Score, HHI, ExtFin, and
Litig are 1.741, 0.234, -0.003, and 0.432, respectively. The mean of earnings volatility (Earn-
Volt) is 0.020, and the mean institutional ownership (Insto) is approximately 69%. The
average ROA and Return over the last quarter are 0.011 and -0.001, respectively. Nini et al.
(2012) also document a negative stock return in the quarter before a DCV is disclosed. The
average firm size (Size) and book-to-market (Btm) of observations in our sample are 6.982
(natural log of firm assets) and 0.479, respectively. On average, the firms in our sample are
covered by 5.67 analysts (Coverage) and have an average net asset bloat (Bloated) of 2.626.
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables in our sample presented in
Table 1. Viol is positively correlated with management forecast biases and forecast optimism
with statistical significance at the 1% level. These correlations provide univariate evidence
consistent with our predictions. Viol is also significantly correlated with many of the control
variables: specifically, it is positively correlated with net external financing in the current
quarter, earnings volatility, losses, net asset bloat, and book-to-market, and it is negatively
correlated with Z-score, institutional ownership, ROA, stock return over the previous quarter,
firm size, and analyst coverage.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Main Results
Before turning to our multivariate analyses, we present some graphical evidence. One
concern is that the change in disclosure characteristics may already be present several years
before the occurrence of the covenant violation, which would make it unlikely that the
expected DCV is driving managers’ changes in disclosure. Focusing on the firms with a
DCV in quarter t, the first graph in Figure 1 presents the average forecast bias around
the DCV. The forecast bias clearly peaks around the DCV itself, indicating that managers
significantly alter their disclosure right before the DCV. In the second part of Figure 1, we
plot the likelihood of issuing an optimistic forecast around the DCV. Again, we observe a
clear increase as compared to the previous periods and a drop after the DCV. Indeed, the
likelihood of issuing an optimistic forecast increases significantly from 50% two years before
the DCV to 60% in the violation quarter. Table 3 reports results from estimating equation
(1) with MFE and Optim as the dependent variables. Columns (1) and (2) show that the
coefficients on Viol are positive and statistically significant in both specifications with a
value of 0.006 and 0.400 for MFE and Optim, respectively. In addition to being statistically
significant, the coefficients on Viol are also economically significant in size. The magnitude
of the coefficient on Viol in Column (1) is approximately 160% of the magnitude of the effect
of Btm.9 The marginal effect of Viol in Column (2) is 14.35%, which is larger than the effect
of Btm (untabulated 5.88%).
Many of the included control variables are statistically significant as well. Management
forecast biases are positively associated with industry concentration (HHI ), whether or not a
firm is located in a high-litigation industry (Litig), recent losses (Loss), profitability (ROA),
9It is customary to evaluate the economic effect by comparing it to the mean or median of the dependent
variable. In our case, however, this would result in division by a number very close to zero (See Panel B
of Table 1). Instead, we compare the effect of Viol to that of Btm in order to obtain economic significance
in a relative manner. To do so, we multiply the coefficient on Viol by the standard deviation of Viol, and
scale this by the corresponding product for Btm. We continue to use a similar procedure to calculate the
economic magnitude of our key variables in other OLS estimations.
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net asset bloat (Bloated), and book-to-market (Btm). Forecast biases are negatively as-
sociated with earnings volatility (EarnVolt) and stock returns over the previous quarter
(Return). Forecast optimism is increasing in recent net external financing (ExtFin), losses
(Loss), and book-to-market (Btm) and decreasing in earnings volatility (EarnVolt), recent
stock returns (Return), and firm size (Size). Taken together, the results presented in Table
4 support H1.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation of Main Results
To reinforce our finding that managers issue optimistically biased forecasts prior to a
DCV, we also perform cross-sectional tests and identify the incentives and costs of biasing
earnings forecasts before a DCV. Specifically, we partition our sample into quintiles of risk-
taking (capital expenditure and return volatility), benefits to shareholders (dividend payout),
risk of losing control rights (financial distress and proportion of private debts), opportunities
to bias forecasts (analyst forecast dispersion), and reputation concerns (media coverage).
Next, we re-estimate equation (1) with MFE and Optim as the dependent variables and
compare the effect of a DCV on Viol in the low group to the one in the high group. We
discuss each of these tests in the following sections.
Risk Taking
Because equity holders are the residual claimants on a firm’s assets, they disproportion-
ately benefit from high-risk projects, in contrast to debtholders whose claims on the firm
are fixed (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Managers may choose to invest more or in riskier
projects as a last resort, knowing that a high payoff could keep the firm from violating a
covenant and financially deteriorating even more. Given the prior work documenting in-
creases in CEO turnover following a DCV (Nini et al., 2012), managers may believe that
these actions increase their chances of retaining employment at the firm. Shareholders may
not necessarily object to the increased riskiness of the projects chosen by managers because
it increases the value of their claim on the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While we do
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not observe the portfolio of projects chosen by management, we can observe the amount of
capital expenditure and the volatility of a firm’s stock. If managers use optimistic forecasts
to help justify making investments or taking on riskier projects, we will observe that the
effect of DCV on forecast bias increases in capital expenditure or in firms’ return volatility
in the periods just before a DCV.
Table 4 presents the capital expenditure (CAPEX) results. Columns (1) and (3) present
the MFE and Optim results for the the lowest quintile, and Columns (2) and (4) present
the results for the highest quintile. The MFE effect that we observe in the full sample is
still present in both the low and high CAPEX partitions, with both specifications yielding
statistically significant results. The coefficients on Viol are 0.004 and 0.010 for low and
high CAPEX, respectively. As predicted, however, the coefficient on Viol is larger in the
sample of firms with high CAPEX, than in the sample of those with low CAPEX (χ2 =
8.00). The Optim effect follows the same pattern for firms with low and high CAPEX. The
coefficient on Viol is 0.200 and 0.936 for firms with low and high CAPEX, respectively, and
the coefficient is statistically larger in the low leverage partition (χ2 = 13.03). Firms with
higher CAPEX are taking on more risk through their increased investments, a choice that is
more difficult to justify to lenders if debtholders believe a debt covenant will soon be violated.
We interpret these results as suggesting that managers with higher CAPEX before a DCV
are more likely manipulate their voluntary forecasts in order to conceal upcoming DCVs and
delay lenders’ ability to gain control rights. Alternatively, managers that increase CAPEX
before a DCV, acting in the interest of shareholders, may prefer to issue optimistic forecasts
in order to appear consistent with their observable actions in order to reduce reputation
costs with lenders. In this argument, lenders may look more favorably on managers that
are optimistic in both their CAPEX and forecast issuance than on managers who increase
CAPEX but issue accurate (and low) forecasts. Table 5 presents similar results when we use
an alternative measure of risk taking, stock return volatility (RetVolt).
Benefits to Shareholders
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Managers who are strategically modifying their earnings forecasts in order to lower the
perceived likelihood of an upcoming DCV may have incentives to justify taking real actions
that benefit shareholders directly – actions that lenders would be likely to prohibit once
they gain control rights following a DCV. Nini et al. (2012) show that covenant violations
are followed immediately by a reduction in dividend payouts. If managers are attempting to
benefit shareholders at the expense of debtholders, then evidence that managers are paying
out a firm’s cash holdings to shareholders is convincing evidence that this is taking place.
DCVs are not exogenous events, and managers may very well be taking many actions in
their efforts to improve the financial prospects of the firm in ways that benefit both debt
and equity holders. It would be difficult for managers to argue, however, that increased
dividend payments to shareholders help the firm in general, and debtholders in particular,
to survive the economic conditions that led to a DCV. We predict that the same managers
who increase dividend payments are also more likely to display larger forecast bias and be
more optimistic in their management forecasts before a DCV in order to justify increasing
dividends.
Table 6 presents the dividend payout results. We define significant increases in dividend
payout (SigDiv) to be equal to one if a firm increases more than 50% of dividend from the
same quarter of last year to the current quarter.10 Columns (1) and (3) present the MFE
and Optim results for the firms with a significant increase in dividend payout (SigDiv=1),
while Columns (2) and (4) present the results for other firms (SigDiv=0). The MFE and
Optim effects that we observe in the full sample are still present in both the partitions, with
the coefficient on Viol remaining statistically significant in all specifications. The coefficient
on Viol in the forecast bias (MFE ) specifications is larger in the sample of firms with high
dividend payout than in the sample of other firms, consistent with our predictions (χ2 =
2.70).We find similar results for forecast optimism (Optim). Together, these results are
10We posit that the managers who increase dividends by a significant amount are more likely to bias
forecasts. As a robustness check, we find that our results (untabulated) are not affected if we use 40%, 60%,
or 100% as the threshold to define significant increases in dividend payout.
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consistent with managers being more willing to manipulate their forecasts when they have
an incentive to justify paying higher dividends.
Risk of Losing Control Rights
Covenant violations are associated with a shift of firm control to lenders (e.g., Roberts
and Sufi, 2009b); however, we expect that a CEO’s risk of losing control rights is related
to the effectiveness of creditors’ control of a firm with potential DCVs. First, financial
distress likely foreshadows the replacement of managers because creditors’ power is limited
to controlling debtors when they fail to pay as promised or violate a covenant (Baird and
Rasmussen, 2006). Second, the scale of private lending to the borrowing firm increases the
power to replace a CEO because it increases the power of creditors on the board (Ivashina
et al., 2016). In addition, if outstanding private debt is relatively low, managers can refinance
these loans more easily and avoid possible adverse consequences. Therefore, we believe that
covenant violations should be examined along with both the firm’s performance and the level
of its private loans outstanding. A CEO’s risk of losing control rights is positively related to
the level of a firm’s financial distress and the proportion of private loans outstanding, and
these factors affect managers’ incentives to optimistically bias earnings forecasts to lower the
perceived likelihood of a DCV.
Table 7 presents these results. Empirically, we partition our sample firms into the High
(Low) Distress sub-samples if they have the lowest (highest) quintile of Z Score (Z-Score).
Columns (1) and (3) present the MFE and Optim results for the the High Distress sub-
samples, and Columns (2) and (4) present the results for the Low Distress sub-samples. As
predicted, the coefficient on Viol is larger in the sample of firms with high distress risk than
in the sample of firms with low distress risk (χ2 = 33.34 and 4.22, respectively). We also
find similar results if we use the proportion of private debt to total debt as a proxy for the
risk of losing firm control (from Columns (5) to (8)).
Opportunities to Bias Forecasts
Rogers and Stocken (2005) show that managers’ incentive to bias earnings forecasts de-
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creases with the market’s ability to detect their misrepresentation. Consequently, we expect
that managers will be more likely to misrepresent their information in order to lower the
perceived likelihood of an upcoming DCV when it is more difficult for the market to detect
the bias. Table 8 presents the results of using analyst dispersion as a proxy for forecast dif-
ficulty. Overall, these results indicate that forecast difficulty increases the effect of DCV on
optimistic forecast bias, consistent with our prediction. Specifically, the coefficient on Viol
is significantly positive in the sub-samples with higher analyst dispersion (Columns (1) and
(3)), but it is insignificant in the sub-samples with lower analyst dispersion (Columns (2)
and (4)). The differences between the estimates across the high and low forecast difficulty
sub-samples are all significant, as predicted (χ2 = 6.13 or 4.03, respectively). Our results
hold if we use alternative proxies of forecast difficulty, specifically: earnings volatility, num-
ber of segments, or analyst following (Rogers and Stocken, 2005; Yeung, 2009). For brevity,
we do not tabulate these additional results.
Reputation Concerns
Another potential negative consequence of optimistically biasing forecasts before a DCV
is the damage to a manager’s reputation and personal image. Economic theory proposes that
reputation often serves as an informal enforcement mechanism against opportunistic behavior
(e.g., Kreps et al., 1982; Gao et al., 2014). Specifically, managers with significant reputations
at stake are less likely to indulge in opportunistic behavior that may negatively affect their
future career path (e.g., Fama, 1980; Kreps et al., 1982). Consistent with theory, empirical
evidence shows that opportunistic behavior leads to losses ex post, and the losses increase
in personal reputation capital, which suggests that the cost of improper behavior exposed to
the public is higher for managers with high reputation capital (e.g., Atanasov et al., 2012).
Therefore, reputation concerns increase the cost of optimistically biasing forecasts in order
to delay an upcoming DCV.
Empirically, we follow Dai et al. (2015) and measure reputation concerns using the media
coverage of a firm. Table 9 presents the results. Columns (1) and (3) present the MFE and
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Optim results for the the highest quintile, and Columns (2) and (4) present the results for
the lowest quintile. The coefficients on Viol are 0.00752 and 0.75179 for low media coverage
for the MFE and Optim specifications, respectively. As predicted, the coefficient on Viol
is larger in the sample of firms with low media coverage than in the sample of those with
high media coverage (χ2 = 3.02 and 4.80, respectively). We find qualitatively similar results
(untabulated) using corporate social responsibility performance as the proxy for reputation
concern (Gao et al., 2014; Dai et al., 2015).
Overall, we interpret these six cross-sectional tests as providing evidence that managers
are more willing to strategically alter their earnings forecasts in order to lower the perceived
likelihood of an upcoming covenant violation when the cost of doing so is lower. Importantly,
these results increase the plausibility of our interpretation of our main findings.
4.3 CEO Turnovers
Throughout the paper we argue that managers change their voluntary disclosure choices
before a DCV in order to take actions (increase investment, take on riskier projects, and
increase dividends) that would benefit shareholders but would likely be opposed by lenders
after a DCV. Our cross-sectional tests provide consistent evidence that managers are more
likely to pursue this strategy when it is less likely for the voluntary disclosure bias to be
detected as intentional. We further investigate the career consequences to CEOs who issue
optimistic forecasts before a DCV by investigating one important career outcome for man-
agers taking these actions, CEO turnover. Specifically, we examine CEO turnover for firms
that violate a debt covenant interacted with forecast error and forecast optimism of earnings
guidance before the DCV and report the results in Table 10.
The coefficient on the main effect Viol is unsurprisingly positive and significant, indicating
that CEOs are more likely to be fired after a DCV, consistent with prior work (see e.g.,
(Nini et al., 2012)). Interestingly, the coefficients on the interaction between Optim and
MFE and Viol are significantly negative, indicating that CEOs that issued inaccurate and
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optimistic forecasts before the covenant violation were less likely to be fired in the period after
violation. These results provide evidence that managers’ delaying the perceived likelihood
of a DCV through their voluntary disclosure choices leads to personal benefits in addition
to the benefits they were able to generate for shareholders. One explanation is that they
were able to ”buy time” in which to formulate a convincing post-violation strategy that
they could present to lenders during the loan contract renegotiation. Another potential
explanation is that, on average, the increases in investment and increases in risky project
selection associated with the optimistic forecasts lead to positive firm outcomes that make
shareholders and creditors more likely to keep CEOs in place. Importantly, the strategy to
use voluntary disclosure to decrease the perceived likelihood of an upcoming DCV does not
seem personally costly to CEOs in terms of job security, in fact, we provide evidence that
this strategy benefits CEOs.
5 Robustness Tests
Alternative Explanations
The results from the previous section demonstrate that, on average, managers issue
earnings guidance that exhibits larger forecast bias and is more likely to be optimistic in the
quarter before a covenant violation. Throughout the paper, we argue that managers privately
anticipate the DCV and avoid signaling this violation earlier by issuing more optimistic
forecasts. One potential alternative explanation of our findings is that our results are driven
by managers’ behavioral characteristics rather than by the actions of rational managers who
strategically modify firms’ voluntary disclosure to deliberately favor equity holders at the
expense of creditors. Indeed, a recent stream of research has highlighted the role of managers’
behavioral traits, such as overconfidence, in explaining corporate choices (e.g., Ben-David
et al., 2013), which could potentially lead to both optimistic forecasts and covenant violation.
In this section, we perform two distinct robustness tests to plausibly rule out the possibility
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that our results are driven by underlying static and/or dynamic behavioral characteristics
of managers at firms that eventually violate a debt covenant.
The first concern is the possibility that firms that violate covenants are run by managers
who are different from (i.e., more overconfident) than managers of firms that do not violate
covenants during our sample period. If this is true and managerial overconfidence can explain
the positive relation between DCVs and forecast optimism, we would expect a negative
association between covenant violations and forecast width. Indeed, greater forecast precision
has been identified as one of the necessary conditions of managerial overconfidence (Hilary
and Hsu, 2011). We directly test this alternative explanation and report our results in
Column (1) of Table 11. Specifically, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient
on our Viol variable. We measure Width as the difference between the upper- and lower-
end estimates, scaled by price (point estimates then have a range of zero). This indicates
that forecast width is larger for guidance issued by managers in firms that are about to
experience a DCV. This finding is not consistent with managerial overconfidence. It is,
however, consistent with managers providing vague forecasts in order to reduce the perceived
likelihood of an upcoming DCV. In addition, we follow Hilary and Hsu (2011) and construct
a partition variable, Streak, the number of consecutive accurate earnings forecasts for a
given firm in the last four quarters before the current forecast is made. If our results are
driven by managerial overconfidence, we would expect managers to be more likely to issue
optimistically biased forecasts before a DCV if they have issued accurate forecasts in the past
(e.g., Streak > 0 ). The results in Columns (2)-(5), however, do not support this conjecture.
Last, including firm or manager fixed effects in our model does not affect our inferences
(untabulated). These results further mitigate the concern that time-invariant managerial
style, especially the personal attributes of managers, could explain our findings (e.g., Bamber
et al., 2010).
Second, a recent study by Hilary et al. (2016) finds that success in the recent past leads
to more optimistic forecasts in the future. These recent findings suggest that if our results
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are driven by dynamic managerial optimism, we should expect them to be concentrated
in firms that have experienced good performance in the recent past. We re-run our tests
exploring these alternative explanations and provide the results in Table 11. Specifically,
we re-estimate Equation (1) partitioning our sample using firms’ past performance. We
define a firm as having had relatively bad performance if its average return on assets over
the last four quarters is lower than that of the industry median. Columns (6)-(9) provide
evidence that past performance does not affect the association between covenant violation
and forecast optimism that we document in Table 4. That is, both firms with good past
operating performance and those with bad past operating performance display, on average,
an increase in forecast bias and optimism before the occurrence of a covenant violation.
In untabulated analyses, these robustness tests are not affected if we use consistency or
frequency of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks to categorize past performance, in line
with the design in Hilary et al. (2016), although the reduced sample size does weaken our
testing power.
Correlated Omitted Variables
Next, to mitigate the effect arising from other omitted variables (e.g., deteriorated actual
firm performance, confounding effects from other firm characteristics), we follow Nini et al.
(2012) and mimic a “quasi-discontinuity” approach. Our identification strategy is based on
comparing firms just above and just below the contract covenant thresholds. The primary
benefit of using this specification is that we are able to identify separately the effect of
violations from expected changes in outcomes related to differences in the underlying funda-
mentals of violators and non-violators, controlling for a variety of covenant-related variables.
The covenant-related variables we include are: the ratio of operating cash flow to lagged
assets, the leverage ratio (debt-to-assets), the ratio of interest expense to lagged assets, the
ratio of net worth to assets, the current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), and the
market-to-book ratio. The first five of these variables capture the most common ratios in-
cluded in financial covenants (Roberts and Sufi, 2009a). We also include the market-to-book
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ratio and tangibility because both of them are powerful predictors of many firm outcomes
and inherent business models. Note that we include these variables linearly, squared, and
to the third power. We include two lags of the first differences of these variables, and three-
and four-quarter lags of the levels of these variables. Appendix B reports the estimation
results and shows that our inferences do not change. 11
Last, we implement a propensity score matching (PSM) approach that pairs our treat-
ment (Viol=1) and control (Viol=0) firms based on similar observable characteristics (De-
hejia and Wahba, 2002). We implement this procedure by first estimating a probit regression
to model the probability of having a DCV. Next, we estimate the propensity score for each
non-control sample using the predicted probabilities from the probit model. We then match
each control observation with a treatment observation using the nearest neighbor matching
(caliper distance of 0.01, without replacement). The PSM model includes all control vari-
ables in Table 4.12 The results presented in Appendix C show that the coefficient on Viol
is still positive and significant in both MFE and Optim specifications, although again the
11We do this to flexibly control for continuous functions of the underlying variables, on which covenants
are written, and exploit the discontinuity created at the point of violation. By using a first-difference
specification, we control for time-invariant, firm-level effects that may be different between violators and
non-violators. By flexibly controlling for the current and lagged level of a variety of variables known to affect
outcomes, we hope to control for the expected time-series path of outcomes following deterioration in firm
performance. The benefit of this approach is that we identify the effect of a violation based on differences
in outcomes for violators relative to differences in outcomes for non-violators with a similar pre-violation
pattern in performance.
12Untabulated results indicate that the differences in mean values of the variables used for the matching
procedure are statistically significant prior to the PSM procedure (12 out of 13 cases), but all of them become
insignificant after the matching, which indicates that the matches are effective in narrowing the differences
between the firm characteristics of DCV firms and those of non-DCV firms.
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reduced sample size weakens our testing power (num. of obs.= 479 firm-quarter pairs).13 14
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the relation between strategic voluntary disclosure and debt covenant
violation. Specifically, we find robust evidence that managers issue more optimistic earnings
guidance prior to a covenant violation. We interpret our findings as evidence suggesting that
managers attempt to justify taking actions that favor shareholders but which debtholders
are likely to stop in the event of a covenant violation. Consistent with this, we document
that the managers who take actions that favor shareholders at the expense of debtholders
are those most likely to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Specifically, our
results are stronger when firms invest in more capital expenditure, take on riskier projects, or
significantly increase dividend payouts. Consistent with the intuition that managers are more
likely to act in favor of equity holders when they have a higher likelihood of losing control
rights to lenders, our results are concentrated in the firms that are financially constrained or
for which private debt is the major source of financing. Moreover, our results become weaker
with the market’s ability to detect bias in forecasts and for firms with higher media coverage.
13To examine the relevance of upcoming DCVs on current management disclosure choices, we employ the
full sample of firms that provide management earnings forecasts over our sample period. In order to isolate
the effects attributable to DCVs for covenant violators, we restrict our sample to firms with at least one
DCV over our sample period as a robustness check. Untabulated findings reveal inferences identical to those
revealed by Table 3.
14We also acknowledge that managers may have discretion over the forecast issuance decision. Hence, the
observed association between DCV and forecast bias may not represent the true relationship in a complete
series of management forecasts (including both issued and unissued management forecasts) due to the non-
random sample selection. Our main results of forecast bias, however, are less likely to be driven by such
selection issues for two reasons. First, we do not find a significant change in forecast issuance as a DCV
approaches (untabulated), which mitigates the concern that the observed change in forecast bias is potentially
related to changes in forecast issuance. Second, we follow Lennox and Park (2006) and Gong et al. (2011) to
implement a Heckman two-stage procedure. Following these two studies, we use two instruments, the earnings
response coefficient (ERC) and the quarterly industry-median values of ERC. Both variables plausibly explain
the management forecast issuance decision (first stage) but have no obvious direct effect on forecast bias
(second stage). Consistent with this view, the correlation between the instruments and an indicator variable
for the forecast issuance is positive and significant (p-values<0.01). In contrast, the correlation between the
instruments and the error terms of the second stage are low (the p-values range from 0.35 to 0.91). More
importantly, the untabulated second-stage regressions continue to demonstrate a positive and significant
relation between forecast bias and covenant violation.
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Our results are consistent with the notion that the choice to bias forecasts is constrained
by how effectively managers could frame theirs actions as unintentional bad decisions rather
than opportunistic ones. In other words, the effectiveness of using forecasts to frame their
actions is perceived to be higher for firms that face more information asymmetry and for
managers that have lower reputation concerns. Lastly, we find that managers who are more
optimistic in their forecasts are less likely to be replaced after a DCV. Overall, our findings
suggest that it is less costly for managers to take shareholder-friendly actions before a DCV
if their forecasts also signal optimism about a firm’s prospects, rather than conveying that
managers took opportunistic actions to benefit shareholders before the shifting of control
rights to lenders following a covenant violation.
Our study contributes to the accounting literature investigating managers’ behavior lead-
ing up to a covenant violation. We also add to the vast literature on the strategic disclosure
of managers by documenting that future covenant violations create incentives for managers
to alter their provision of voluntary disclosure. Finally, our results highlight how managers
use disclosure as a tool to act in favor of equity holders at the expense of creditors; thus
our findings contribute to the rich literature in finance examining risk-shifting behavior and
shareholder-creditor conflicts.
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Figure 1: Management Forecast Characteristics around Debt Covenant Violation
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
Qt-8~Qt-5 Qt-4~Qt-1 Qt Qt+1~Qt+4
MFE
MFE
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Qt-8~Qt-5 Qt-4~Qt-1 Qt Qt+1~Qt+4
Optim
Optim
36
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082058 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports summary statistics. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc.
MFE 15,698 -0.0004 0.0078 -0.0020 -0.0006 0.0000
Optim 15,698 0.3722 0.4834 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Viol 15,698 0.0305 0.1720 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Z-Score 15,698 1.7405 1.5994 1.1027 1.7377 2.4955
HHI 15,698 0.2342 0.1628 0.1113 0.1947 0.3042
ExtFin 15,698 -0.0029 0.0433 -0.0166 -0.0014 0.0052
Litig 15,698 0.4320 0.4954 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
EarnVolt 15,698 0.0200 0.0283 0.0054 0.0101 0.0215
Insto 15,698 0.6892 0.2252 0.5536 0.7318 0.8602
Loss 15,698 0.1757 0.3806 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ROA 15,698 0.0114 0.0303 0.0041 0.0140 0.0248
Return 15,698 -0.0007 0.2171 -0.1232 -0.0088 0.1083
Bloated 15,698 2.6259 2.4029 1.1676 2.0317 3.2318
Size 15,698 6.9819 1.6192 5.8796 6.8758 7.9843
Btm 15,698 0.4788 0.3389 0.2541 0.3962 0.6070
Coverage 15,698 1.8981 0.7534 1.3863 1.9459 2.3979
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix
This table reports Pearson correlations. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (N= 15, 698) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) MFE
(2) Optim 0.504*** 1
(3) Viol 0.173*** 0.118*** 1
(4) Zscore -0.012 -0.050*** -0.083*** 1
(5) HHI -0.007 0.005 0.002 0.019 1
(6) ExtFin 0.014 0.025* 0.009 -0.035** -0.024* 1
(7) Litig -0.025* -0.006 -0.019 0.032** -0.183*** 0.042*** 1
(8) EarnVolt -0.003 -0.003 0.063*** -0.306*** -0.096*** 0.066*** 0.149*** 1
(9) Insto -0.033** -0.051*** -0.095*** 0.229*** 0.034** -0.037** -0.016 -0.203*** 1
(10) Loss 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.161*** -0.355*** -0.062*** 0.048*** 0.095*** 0.329*** -0.189*** 1
(11) ROA -0.054*** -0.073*** -0.165*** 0.487*** 0.027* -0.068*** -0.034** -0.321*** 0.212*** -0.683*** 1
(12) Return -0.176*** -0.197*** -0.099*** -0.02 -0.009 0.021 -0.017 -0.035** -0.036** -0.078*** 0.081*** 1
(13) Bloated 0.048*** 0.034** 0.056*** -0.194*** -0.091*** 0.019 -0.109*** 0.014 -0.049*** 0.147*** -0.202*** -0.047*** 1
(14) Size -0.072*** -0.100*** -0.130*** 0.318*** -0.026* -0.072*** 0.021 -0.188*** 0.514*** -0.224*** 0.230*** -0.051*** 0.110*** 1
(15) Btm 0.140*** 0.126*** 0.127*** -0.230*** 0.057*** -0.046*** -0.151*** -0.067*** -0.212*** 0.196*** -0.255*** 0.108*** 0.196*** -0.443*** 1
(16) Coverage -0.034** -0.044*** -0.067*** 0.188*** -0.136*** -0.014 0.168*** -0.035** 0.476*** -0.067*** 0.086*** -0.055*** 0.100*** 0.662*** -0.288*** 1
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Table 3: Debt Covenant Violation and Management Forecast Optimism
This table presents the results from regressions relating management forecast optimism to
the violation of debt covenants. Column (1) reports the estimation results of the OLS
regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression. All dependent and
independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
MFE Optim
Viol 0.00563*** 0.40047***
(0.000) (0.000)
Z-Score 0.00012 -0.01120
(0.184) (0.333)
HHI 0.00107* 0.13258
(0.079) (0.201)
ExtFin 0.00172 0.55414**
(0.362) (0.027)
Litig 0.00062** 0.09266*
(0.018) (0.063)
EarnVolt -0.01273*** -2.64205***
(0.001) (0.000)
Insto 0.00098** -0.03404
(0.037) (0.634)
Loss 0.00072** 0.07827*
(0.025) (0.065)
ROA 0.01507*** 0.91051
(0.001) (0.120)
Return -0.00495*** -1.02189***
(0.000) (0.000)
Bloated 0.00006* -0.00019
(0.095) (0.973)
Size -0.00001 -0.05235***
(0.945) (0.002)
Btm 0.00176*** 0.16421***
(0.005) (0.003)
Coverage -0.00005 0.02443
(0.698) (0.347)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 15,698 15,698
R2 0.058 0.049
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Variation in Capital Expenditure
This table presents the results from regressions relating management forecast optimism to
the violation of debt covenants. Column (1) reports the estimation results of the OLS
regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression. All dependent and
independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low High Low High
MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.00390*** 0.01046*** 0.20030** 0.93562***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000)
Z-Score 0.00015 0.00013 -0.03405 0.01923
(0.448) (0.191) (0.162) (0.287)
HHI 0.00185 0.00020 0.14218 -0.19144
(0.154) (0.896) (0.416) (0.406)
ExtFin -0.00122 0.00383 0.18746 1.04639*
(0.759) (0.247) (0.718) (0.056)
Litig 0.00180*** -0.00039 0.17950** -0.02122
(0.005) (0.437) (0.037) (0.830)
EarnVolt -0.02398* -0.01236* -1.85068 -2.12763***
(0.064) (0.070) (0.163) (0.004)
Insto 0.00075 0.00109 -0.18427 0.08935
(0.363) (0.281) (0.116) (0.614)
Loss 0.00107* 0.00098 0.12943** 0.25515**
(0.066) (0.134) (0.043) (0.011)
ROA 0.01088 0.01737*** 2.95691*** 0.33633
(0.292) (0.007) (0.010) (0.805)
Return -0.00591*** -0.00512*** -0.81063*** -1.02782***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bloated 0.00011 0.00018 0.00940 -0.00606
(0.289) (0.114) (0.344) (0.647)
Size -0.00032* 0.00006 -0.07787*** -0.04506
(0.065) (0.790) (0.008) (0.177)
Btm -0.00013 0.00257** 0.07027 0.24833**
(0.880) (0.048) (0.371) (0.015)
Coverage -0.00006 -0.00007 0.04667 0.01669
(0.823) (0.812) (0.278) (0.761)
χ2-test for difference 8.00 13.03
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,471 2,850 3,471 2,850
R2 0.053 0.095 0.068 0.043
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Variation in Return Volatility
This table presents the results from regressions relating management forecast optimism to
the violation of debt covenants. Column (1) reports the estimation results of the OLS
regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression. All dependent and
independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low High Low High
MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.00218*** 0.00830*** 0.15952 0.56084***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000)
Z-Score 0.00031* 0.00001 0.02735 0.01025
(0.055) (0.937) (0.500) (0.562)
HHI 0.00031 0.00126 -0.00075 0.12307
(0.686) (0.465) (0.997) (0.471)
ExtFin 0.00181 0.00724* 0.94491* 1.34818***
(0.559) (0.077) (0.083) (0.004)
Litig 0.00068 0.00069 0.09189 0.10878
(0.160) (0.415) (0.312) (0.250)
EarnVolt 0.01221 -0.02076*** -2.63369 -1.83999**
(0.290) (0.005) (0.301) (0.024)
Insto -0.00007 0.00165 -0.36934** 0.07656
(0.915) (0.139) (0.015) (0.548)
Loss -0.00025 0.00156** -0.09528 0.16066*
(0.725) (0.029) (0.436) (0.063)
ROA -0.00791 0.02825*** -1.16463 0.60375
(0.373) (0.005) (0.528) (0.604)
Return -0.00193* -0.00599*** -1.18106*** -0.94674***
(0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bloated 0.00001 0.00002 0.01989 -0.01349
(0.904) (0.784) (0.241) (0.126)
Size -0.00000 0.00001 -0.02009 -0.10515**
(0.985) (0.965) (0.474) (0.014)
Btm 0.00137 0.00240** -0.13431 0.13736*
(0.377) (0.023) (0.412) (0.076)
Coverage -0.00038 -0.00025 -0.05636 -0.00257
(0.105) (0.514) (0.297) (0.957)
χ2-test for difference 8.49 3.14
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,458 2,850 3,458 2,850
R2 0.031 0.089 0.061 0.066
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Table 6: Cross-Sectional Variation in Dividend Payouts
This table presents the results from regressions relating various management forecast opti-
mism to the violation of debt covenants. Column (1) reports the estimation results of the
OLS regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression. All dependent
and independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses,
and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SigDiv = 1 SigDiv = 0 SigDiv = 1 SigDiv = 0
MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.01222** 0.00541*** 1.19266** 0.38191***
(0.023) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)
Z-Score 0.00002 0.00012 -0.02412 -0.01101
(0.952) (0.187) (0.710) (0.342)
HHI -0.00053 0.00106* -0.07903 0.13707
(0.669) (0.094) (0.843) (0.189)
ExtFin 0.00030 0.00192 0.51508 0.57805**
(0.952) (0.292) (0.694) (0.019)
Litig -0.00041 0.00066** 0.39370** 0.08072
(0.647) (0.010) (0.019) (0.109)
EarnVolt 0.04427 -0.01336*** -2.04797 -2.63378***
(0.231) (0.000) (0.559) (0.000)
Insto -0.00050 0.00113** -0.11250 -0.02221
(0.764) (0.021) (0.663) (0.758)
Loss 0.00067 0.00078** 0.08646 0.08425*
(0.657) (0.015) (0.715) (0.054)
ROA -0.03744 0.01758*** -3.91524 1.11449*
(0.207) (0.000) (0.279) (0.065)
Return -0.00341* -0.00505*** -0.80966** -1.03177***
(0.077) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000)
Bloated -0.00012 0.00007* -0.00330 0.00028
(0.536) (0.068) (0.851) (0.961)
Size -0.00011 -0.00001 -0.07791 -0.05238***
(0.697) (0.910) (0.167) (0.002)
Btm -0.00272 0.00186*** -0.08106 0.16551***
(0.221) (0.003) (0.776) (0.002)
Coverage -0.00027 -0.00005 0.07714 0.02188
(0.592) (0.724) (0.536) (0.408)
χ2-test for difference 2.70 2.74
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 782 14,916 782 14,916
R2 0.141 0.059 0.061 0.050
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Table 7: Cross-Sectional Variation in Risk of Losing Control Rights
This table presents the results from regressions relating management forecast optimism to the violation of debt covenants.
Column (1) reports the estimation results of the OLS regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression.
All dependent and independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Distress Low Distress High Distress Low Distress High Private Low Private High Private Low Private
MFE MFE Optim Optim MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.00866*** 0.00025 0.50055*** 0.08420 0.00690*** 0.00121 0.46358*** 0.11747
(0.000) (0.633) (0.000) (0.747) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000) (0.307)
Z-Score 0.00014 0.00021 0.01175 0.00576 0.00042 0.00021 0.01396 0.02842
(0.505) (0.132) (0.543) (0.898) (0.181) (0.237) (0.648) (0.454)
HHI 0.00348** -0.00081 0.13974 0.03104 0.00027 -0.00165* 0.08748 -0.34463
(0.043) (0.391) (0.479) (0.907) (0.863) (0.073) (0.648) (0.111)
ExtFin 0.00113 0.00414* 0.64873 1.53901*** 0.00570** 0.00083 0.47649 0.60042
(0.839) (0.055) (0.217) (0.003) (0.025) (0.830) (0.349) (0.461)
Litig 0.00130 -0.00000 0.01593 0.11454 0.00033 -0.00016 -0.04139 -0.01045
(0.165) (0.992) (0.869) (0.392) (0.675) (0.776) (0.717) (0.931)
EarnVolt -0.01800*** -0.00670 -1.15757* -4.37289*** -0.01070 -0.01331 -0.92036 -5.16491***
(0.009) (0.369) (0.070) (0.003) (0.474) (0.394) (0.596) (0.010)
Insto 0.00323** 0.00123 0.18987 -0.20055 -0.00003 -0.00100 0.06747 -0.31780*
(0.029) (0.157) (0.121) (0.283) (0.980) (0.428) (0.706) (0.054)
Loss 0.00211*** -0.00154** 0.20057*** -0.16609 0.00156 0.00002 0.04982 0.12066
(0.001) (0.020) (0.003) (0.272) (0.106) (0.981) (0.646) (0.270)
ROA 0.03137*** -0.00499 2.22556*** -1.19258 0.02303* 0.00017 1.58539 1.34338
(0.001) (0.267) (0.006) (0.489) (0.082) (0.992) (0.325) (0.590)
Return -0.00743*** -0.00122** -0.88442*** -0.91158*** -0.00584*** -0.00591*** -1.09058*** -1.29567***
(0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bloated 0.00001 0.00006 -0.00660 0.00900 0.00000 -0.00006 0.01946 -0.04167**
(0.900) (0.462) (0.429) (0.784) (0.973) (0.528) (0.234) (0.025)
Size -0.00059** 0.00025* -0.11585*** -0.00890 0.00015 0.00017 -0.16059*** -0.03115
(0.034) (0.097) (0.003) (0.801) (0.622) (0.311) (0.002) (0.376)
Btm 0.00123 0.00055 0.06683 0.26865 0.00390*** 0.00161 0.13185 0.30261***
(0.292) (0.797) (0.404) (0.345) (0.006) (0.112) (0.311) (0.007)
Coverage 0.00024 0.00001 0.04823 0.09616 -0.00011 -0.00035 0.02537 -0.02476
(0.599) (0.953) (0.331) (0.146) (0.764) (0.205) (0.711) (0.669)
χ2-test for difference 33.34 4.22 6.08 3.97
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,249 2,987 3,249 2,987 2,308 2,306 2,308 2,306
R2 0.095 0.048 0.056 0.055 0.103 0.031 0.056 0.050
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Table 8: Cross-Sectional Variation in Opportunities to Bias Forecasts
This table presents the results from regressions relating management forecast optimism to
the violation of debt covenants. Column (1) reports the estimation results of the OLS
regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression. All dependent and
independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High StdAF Low StdAF High StdAF Low StdAF
MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.00729*** 0.00150 0.64290*** 0.13985
(0.000) (0.285) (0.000) (0.436)
Z-Score 0.00012 0.00028** -0.04455 0.01287
(0.522) (0.028) (0.201) (0.642)
HHI 0.00062 0.00155* -0.04667 0.18097
(0.724) (0.096) (0.866) (0.264)
ExtFin 0.00671 0.00282 -0.15968 0.76678
(0.166) (0.386) (0.779) (0.213)
Litig -0.00012 0.00088** 0.00346 0.26509**
(0.835) (0.025) (0.964) (0.018)
EarnVolt -0.02274** -0.00468 -2.95480*** -2.65531**
(0.037) (0.374) (0.006) (0.043)
Insto 0.00287** 0.00273*** 0.31362** -0.07391
(0.019) (0.000) (0.049) (0.643)
Loss 0.00167** 0.00054 0.06150 0.06798
(0.031) (0.419) (0.530) (0.605)
ROA 0.02189** 0.00662 0.74761 -1.08146
(0.023) (0.557) (0.568) (0.558)
Return -0.00775*** -0.00278*** -1.36889*** -1.29638***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bloated 0.00008 0.00005 -0.02233* -0.03490**
(0.469) (0.514) (0.087) (0.015)
Size -0.00005 0.00004 -0.08189** -0.00688
(0.797) (0.748) (0.017) (0.824)
Btm 0.00116 0.00261** 0.08899 0.33648**
(0.196) (0.019) (0.338) (0.027)
Coverage 0.00031 0.00019 0.04542 -0.02762
(0.464) (0.376) (0.502) (0.612)
χ2-test for difference 6.13 4.03
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,353 2,325 2,353 2,325
R2 0.084 0.065 0.073 0.075
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Table 9: Cross-Sectional Variation in Reputation Concerns
This table presents the results from regressions relating management forecast optimism to the violation of debt covenants.
Column (1) reports the estimation results of the OLS regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression.
All dependent and independent variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage High Media Coverage Low Media Coverage
MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.00308 0.00752*** 0.17996 0.75179***
(0.108) (0.000) (0.357) (0.000)
Z-Score -0.00006 0.00024 -0.00356 -0.03354
(0.660) (0.281) (0.893) (0.179)
HHI 0.00005 0.00079 0.20582 0.01956
(0.964) (0.564) (0.382) (0.920)
ExtFin -0.00178 0.00682** 0.37658 1.49583**
(0.478) (0.012) (0.576) (0.043)
Litig 0.00014 0.00135*** 0.18654 0.07971
(0.727) (0.003) (0.129) (0.446)
EarnVolt 0.00048 -0.01896* -1.03772 -3.22411**
(0.950) (0.081) (0.470) (0.044)
Insto 0.00255** 0.00172** 0.12958 -0.01785
(0.043) (0.023) (0.566) (0.918)
Loss -0.00012 0.00009 -0.07686 0.08552
(0.862) (0.913) (0.485) (0.513)
ROA 0.01262 0.00963 -0.06447 0.67643
(0.287) (0.342) (0.967) (0.659)
Return -0.00344*** -0.00499*** -1.03934*** -1.41874***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bloated -0.00001 -0.00004 0.00862 -0.02426
(0.934) (0.646) (0.589) (0.235)
Size -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.05452 -0.09323**
(0.912) (0.690) (0.139) (0.015)
Btm -0.00077 0.00043 0.14847 0.01827
(0.358) (0.717) (0.267) (0.876)
Coverage 0.00000 0.00016 -0.06336 0.05000
(0.991) (0.620) (0.419) (0.405)
χ2-test for difference 3.02 4.80
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,248 2,172 2,248 2,172
R2 0.084 0.065 0.073 0.075
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Table 10: CEO Turnovers
This table presents the results from probit regressions of CEO turnovers. Column (1) reports
the estimation results of MFE, and column (2) reports the results of the Optim. Variables
are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
Turnover Turnover
Viol 0.35450* 0.27505*
(0.083) (0.091)
Optim x Viol -0.45044**
(0.046)
MFE x Viol -12.56766**
(0.048)
Optim 0.25951***
(0.000)
MFE 5.21120
(0.167)
Zscore -0.05391** -0.05077*
(0.031) (0.059)
HHI 0.29995 0.24023
(0.260) (0.398)
ExtFin -1.06365* -0.76264
(0.073) (0.173)
Leverage 0.06282 0.04927
(0.810) (0.843)
Litig 0.11394 0.05946
(0.328) (0.598)
EarnVolt -1.56771 -1.55933
(0.237) (0.210)
Insto 0.66610*** 0.54094***
(0.001) (0.007)
Loss 0.05950 0.11224
(0.533) (0.250)
ROA -0.55522 -0.89287
(0.685) (0.513)
Return -0.63615*** -0.62405***
(0.000) (0.000)
Bloated -0.00554 -0.01105
(0.762) (0.534)
Size 0.08878** 0.09291**
(0.016) (0.013)
Btm 0.40832*** 0.46903***
(0.003) (0.000)
Coverage 0.14946** 0.17903**
(0.036) (0.023)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 15,467 15,467
R2 0.069 0.065
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Table 11: Alternative Explanations
This table presents the results of robustness analysis on alternative explanations. Column (1) reports the estimation results
of the OLS regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit regression. All dependent and independent variables
are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustered by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Streak> 0 Streak= 0 Streak> 0 Streak= 0 Bad Others Bad Others
Width MFE MFE Optim Optim MFE MFE Optim Optim
Viol 0.00045** 0.00580*** 0.00400* 0.36046*** 0.72576*** 0.38271*** 0.43243*** 0.00598*** 0.00504***
(0.026) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Z-Score -0.00019*** 0.00007 0.00035** -0.01473 0.00597 -0.01851 -0.00714 0.00023 0.00011
(0.000) (0.361) (0.041) (0.222) (0.804) (0.425) (0.569) (0.295) (0.266)
HHI -0.00037* 0.00087 0.00180 0.04845 0.48161** 0.10369 0.12781 0.00199* 0.00048
(0.060) (0.131) (0.262) (0.647) (0.030) (0.538) (0.306) (0.086) (0.435)
ExtFin -0.00147*** 0.00073 0.00637* 0.39634 1.41378*** 0.90307 0.39046 0.00326 0.00059
(0.006) (0.728) (0.068) (0.140) (0.006) (0.111) (0.164) (0.512) (0.748)
Litig 0.00010 0.00056** 0.00083 0.06455 0.20143* 0.09633 0.07860 0.00108** 0.00040
(0.421) (0.040) (0.113) (0.190) (0.052) (0.187) (0.184) (0.045) (0.137)
EarnVolt 0.01039*** -0.01474*** -0.00248 -3.06952*** -0.44365 0.73044 -3.40543*** -0.01283 -0.00890**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.759) (0.000) (0.728) (0.481) (0.000) (0.283) (0.014)
Insto -0.00146*** 0.00062 0.00323*** -0.03889 0.03435 0.19442* -0.12855 0.00095 0.00095*
(0.000) (0.138) (0.007) (0.577) (0.821) (0.059) (0.141) (0.293) (0.077)
Loss 0.00077*** 0.00087** -0.00038 0.08190* 0.03825 0.13634** 0.05858 0.00133** 0.00028
(0.000) (0.012) (0.603) (0.077) (0.737) (0.013) (0.345) (0.013) (0.439)
ROA -0.00427* 0.01647*** 0.00431 0.83118 1.04498 4.38221*** -0.07360 0.02954*** 0.00792*
(0.073) (0.000) (0.737) (0.215) (0.531) (0.000) (0.920) (0.003) (0.084)
Return 0.00014 -0.00461*** -0.00633*** -0.96269*** -1.36731*** -1.02834*** -1.01665*** -0.00769*** -0.00376***
(0.270) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bloated -0.00018*** 0.00006 0.00010 0.00163 -0.01217 -0.00383 -0.00011 0.00002 0.00009**
(0.000) (0.139) (0.160) (0.771) (0.369) (0.670) (0.988) (0.792) (0.013)
Size -0.00024*** -0.00005 0.00019 -0.05021*** -0.05289* -0.10504*** -0.03513* -0.00050*** 0.00016
(0.000) (0.556) (0.316) (0.003) (0.075) (0.000) (0.073) (0.002) (0.127)
Btm 0.00281*** 0.00152** 0.00268* 0.12933** 0.38721*** 0.20801** 0.23012*** 0.00149 0.00192**
(0.000) (0.011) (0.056) (0.022) (0.003) (0.018) (0.008) (0.125) (0.030)
Coverage -0.00007 -0.00003 0.00015 0.03388 0.00299 0.05962 0.00842 0.00060* -0.00030**
(0.211) (0.817) (0.643) (0.197) (0.955) (0.161) (0.787) (0.075) (0.033)
χ2-test for difference 0.14 3.14 0.43 0.15
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,698 12,497 3,201 12,496 3,201 4,278 11,420 4,278 11,420
R2 0.378 0.057 0.064 0.047 0.054 0.052 0.053 0.077 0.052
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
In this Appendix A, we describe our empirical measures and provide their sources.
Variable Definition Source
Variable of Interest
Viol Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm violates the debt covenant in a quarter, zero otherwise Amir Sufi’s website
Dependent Variables
FreqMF Log of number of 1 plus management forecasts issued in a quarter First Call
Issue Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm issues a forecast in a quarter, zero otherwise First Call
AbFreqMF Abnormal FreqMF, measured as the residual value from the estimation results of Model (1) with the dependent variable of FreqMF (excluding Viol) First Call
Optim Indicator variable equal to 1 if management forecast is greater than realized earnings, zero otherwise First Call
MFE Management forecast bias, measured as the difference between management forecast and realized earnings, scaled by price First Call
Width Management forecast width, measured as the the difference between the upper- and lower-end estimates, scaled by price
(point estimates have a range of zero) First Call
Control Variables
Z-Score Financial distress, measured by Altman’s Z-score at the beginning of current quarter Altman (1968) Compustat
HHI Industry concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and calculated as the sum of squares of firms’
last-quarter market shares of sales within each 4-digit SIC industry Compustat
ExtFin External financing of current quarter, measured as the sum of net equity financing and net debt financing,
scaled by total assets Compustat
Litig Indicator variable set to one for litigious industries including Biotechnology (SIC 2833 to 2836)
Computer Hardware (SIC 3570 to 3577), Electronics (SIC 3600 to 3674), Retailing (SIC 5200 to 5961), Compustat
and Computer Software (SIC 7371 to 7379), and zero otherwise
EarnVolt Earnings volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the quarterly return on assets over the last two years Compustat
Insto Institutional investor ownership, measured as the percentage of institutional ownership in a firm Compustat
at the beginning of current quarter
Loss Negative earnings, an indicator variable equal to one if income before extraordinary items of last quarter is negative, Compustat
and zero otherwise
ROA Return on firm assets of last quarter, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets Compustat
Return Buy-and-hold size-adjusted return over last quarter CRSP
Bloated Net asset bloat of quarter t, measured as book value of equity plus debt, minus cash, and scaled by sales Compustat
Size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of current quarter Compustat
Btm Book-to-market ratio at the beginning of the current quarter, measured as the book value of equity divided Compustat
by the market value of equity at the end of quarter t
Coverage Analyst coverage, measured as natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following in the current quarter First Call
Other Variables
CAPEX Capital expenditure, measured as capital expenditure of current quarter, divided by PPE Compustat
RetVolt Stock return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily stock return in a quarter CRSP
SigDiv Significant increase in dividend payout, measured as an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm increases its dividend more than 50%
compared to the same quarter of last year, zero otherwise Compustat
Private Percentage of private debt, measured as the private debt at the beginning of the quarter, divided by total debt DealScan
StdAF Analyst forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts prior to management forecast IBES
Media Coverage Number of news articles related to a firm over the last four quarters Factiva
Turnover CEO turnover, an indicator variable equal to one if a CEO is replaced over quarter4 t+1 to t+4, and zero otherwise. Execucomp
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Appendix B: Alternative Specification - Nini et al. (2012)
This table presents the results from regressions relating various management forecast opti-
mism to the violation of debt covenants using the specification in Nini et al. (2012). Column
(1) reports the estimation results of the OLS regression, and column (2) reports the results
of the probit regression. Variables are defined in Appendix A. We include the second and
third power of the levels of the covenant control variables, two lags of the first differences of
the covenant control variables, and three- and four-quarter lags of the levels of the covenant
control variables. p-values are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
MFE Optim
Viol 0.00501*** 0.16751***
(0.000) (0.000)
Operating cash flow / average assets -0.00420 -0.51833*
(0.482) (0.078)
Leverage ratio -0.00297 0.15041
(0.748) (0.700)
Interest expense / average assets -0.18386 -2.34439
(0.602) (0.893)
Net worth / assets -0.00202 0.27293
(0.827) (0.273)
Current ratio -0.00002 -0.03145
(0.982) (0.338)
Market-to-book ratio -0.00076 -0.21290***
(0.557) (0.000)
PPE / average assets -0.01124 0.43403
(0.322) (0.391)
Higher-order covenant controls Yes Yes
Lagged first-difference controls Yes Yes
Lagged covenant controls Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 6,593 6,593
R2 0.260 0.177
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Appendix C: Alternative Sample - Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
This table presents the results from regressions relating various management forecast char-
acteristics to the violation of debt covenants using a PSM sample. Column (1) reports the
estimation results of the OLS regression, and column (2) reports the results of the probit
regression. Variables are defined in Appendix A. p-values are reported in parentheses, and
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
MFE Optim
Viol 0.00510*** 0.42952***
(0.000) (0.000)
Zscore 0.00040 0.04888
(0.307) (0.157)
HHI 0.00403 0.08423
(0.129) (0.774)
ExtFin -0.00984 0.63924
(0.276) (0.546)
Litig 0.00316** 0.32547**
(0.032) (0.012)
EarnVolt -0.02299* -1.00717
(0.097) (0.478)
Insto -0.00125 -0.02993
(0.562) (0.878)
Loss -0.00053 -0.08892
(0.681) (0.456)
ROA -0.00435 -1.42313
(0.768) (0.326)
Return -0.00933*** -0.93134***
(0.000) (0.000)
Bloated 0.00008 0.00728
(0.693) (0.670)
Size -0.00038 -0.09835**
(0.302) (0.012)
Btm 0.00332* 0.18351*
(0.062) (0.080)
Coverage -0.00051 -0.01567
(0.455) (0.807)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 958 958
R2 0.103 0.0925
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